Corey Kallenberg is a Security Researcher for The MITRE Corporation who has spent several years investigating operating system and firmware security on Intel computers. In 2012, he co-authored work presented at DEF CON and IEEE S&P on using timing based attestation to detect Windows kernel hooks. In 2013, he helped discover critical problems with current implementations of the Trusted Computing Group's "Static Root of Trust for Measurement" and co-presented this work at NoSuchCon and Black Hat USA. Later, he discovered several vulnerabilities which allowed bypassing of "signed BIOS enforcement" on a number of systems, allowing an attacker to make malicious modifications to the platform firmware. These attacks were presented at EkoParty, HITB, and PacSec. Recently, Corey has presented attacks against the UEFI "Secure Boot" feature. Corey is currently continuing to research the security of UEFI and the Intel architecture.
Appearing at: