Pin Pads or Payment Terminals are widely used to accept payments from customers. These devices run Payment Applications on top of the device specific firmware. It shouldn't come as no surprise to anyone that these applications and operating systems are just as vulnerable as any other systems when it comes to handling user input.
As the use of Chip and Pin continues to replace the fairly basic magnetic stripe cards, these devices are handling more and more complex information from untrusted sources; namely the EMV protocol spoken by all major payment smart-cards. On top of this many of these terminals are connected through Ethernet, GPRS, WiFi or phone lines, which add to the overall attack surface.
We will demonstrate that memory corruption vulnerabilities in payment terminals and applications are a reality and that they can be used to gain code execution on the terminals. Furthermore we will demonstrate and discuss potential payloads and how these can profit an attacker.
Nils is heading the security research at MWR InfoSecurity. He likes to break and exploit stuff, which he demonstrated at pwn2own 2009 and 2010. He has spent most of 2010 and 2011 researching different mobile platforms and how to evade the exploitation mitigations techniques in place on these platforms. His current interest are embedded payment devices. Nils has previously presented at BlackHat on Android security.
Rafa works in the UK as a Security Consultant and Security Researcher for MWR InfoSecurity. He enjoys testing "out of the ordinary" technology and is particularly interested in embedded devices and hardware hacking. He has previously presented innovative research on topics such as USB drivers exploitation and Smart card hacking at various well known security conferences.